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Under transitional economy, imperfect market mechanisms, policy uncertainty 
and the discretion of the government breed the soil of political connection, and 
government control over the allocation of important resources leads to rent-seeking 
behavior of enterprises. Chinese private-owned firms are increasingly aware of the 
value of political connection servering as an important resource during severe 
competitions, such as lighter taxation, financing convenience, government subsidy, 
and acess to certain industries and so on. It is in the transitional environment that the 
informal protection mechanisms seeking government support and policy preferences 
appear. 
Agency problem is the most basic, important problem in modern economics. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) analysed how the agency problem arises, that is when 
enterprises finance from external subject, conflicts of interests between clients and 
agents cause agency problem. Agents do not always act to maximize clients' interests, 
even at the expense of the clients' interests. To effectively solve the conflicts of 
managers and shareholders, we can design effective incentive and restraint 
mechanisms or reduce information asymmetry to ease agency conflicts between firm 
managers and shareholders.  
This paper will study the informal institutional arrangement―political 
connection, which is a typical phenomenon. To examine whether the presence of 
political connection provides a potential "security" and "asylum" for executives of 
listed companies to seek personal interests, or to create greater value for shareholedrs, 
that is, whether political connection will contribute to the company's agency conflicts. 
Inconsistent interests between managers and shareholders cause agency conflicts, 
which will increase agency cost and reduce enterprise value. In accordance with the 
theory of government intervention, political connnection is an extension of 
government intervention which government will interfere with the normal operation 
of enterprises by appointing executives. Managers will bear certain social goals which 
would be detrimental to enterprise value, thus political connnection would increase 
residual loss of shareholders, and agency conflicts will become more severe. In 














resource, firm managers have the incencitive and ability to take full use of political 
connection to gain necessary resources, to build unique advantages, to prevent 
infringement from government, and to improve enterprise value and shareholders’ 
interests, and in the end, agency conflicts may be weakening. In addition, 
politically-connected managers could lead to failure supervision of governance 
mechanisms and weaker constraints on managers’ betraying behaviors. Benefits of 
political connection can not make up the negative effects of failure supervision, and 
then agency cost increases. Studying the relationship between political connection and 
agency cost provides a new thinking way of the correlation study of political 
connection and enterprise value.  
Political connection is usually defined as the managers of an enterprise are now 
or have been served in government department, or as NPC deputies or CPPCC 
members. This paper expands the meaning of political connection, taking into account 
of actual controllers’ political connection and restructuring of state-owned enterprises 
to private enterprises. In this paper, I set as a sample of private enterprises listed in A 
shares in China in 2009, collect related data of political connection and agency cost, 
and examine weather political connection is related to agency cost during 
private-owned firms. Empirical results are as follows: Considering overall corporate 
political connection, political connection is negatively correlated with agency cost, the 
stronger political connection, the smaller the agency cost. Seeking political 
connection helps to solve agency problem and reduce agency conflicts, and then 
agency cost of private-owned firms decreases.  
 




























1.1 研究背景 .........................................................................................................1 
1.2 重要概念界定 .................................................................................................3 
1.2.1 “政治联系”的界定 .................................................................................3 
1.2.2 “代理成本”的界定 .................................................................................5 
1.3 研究思路与框架 .............................................................................................5 
1.4 本文的贡献与不足 .........................................................................................6 
2 制度背景和理论基础 ............................................................................8 
2.1 制度背景分析 .................................................................................................8 














4.1 理论分析和假设提出 ....................................................................................26 
4.2 样本选择和数据来源 ...................................................................................28 

















4.4 模型设定和研究方法 ...................................................................................37 
5 实证结果...............................................................................................39 
5.1 描述性统计 ...................................................................................................39 
5.2 多重共线性检验 ...........................................................................................40 
5.3 回归结果分析 ...............................................................................................42 
5.4 稳健性测试——剔除当年 IPO 的上市公司 ..............................................46 
5.5 进一步验证——不考虑实际控制人的政治联系 .......................................47 
6 主要结论与研究展望 ..........................................................................50 
6.1 主要结论 .......................................................................................................50 
























Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction.............................................................................1 
1.1 Research Background.....................................................................................1 
1.2 Definitions........................................................................................................3 
1.2.1 Definition of political connection ...........................................................3 
1.2.2 Definition of agency cost ........................................................................5 
1.3 Research Method and Structure....................................................................5 
1.4 Innovation and Deficiency..............................................................................6 
Chapter 2 Institutional Background and Theory Basis ........................8 
2.1 Institutional Background Analysis ................................................................8 
2.2 Theory Analysis .............................................................................................10 
2.2.1 Resource dependence theory.................................................................10 
2.2.2 Rent-seeking theory ..............................................................................10 
2.2.3 Agency theory .......................................................................................12 
2.2.4 Asymmetric information theory............................................................14 
Chapter 3 Literature Review .................................................................16 
3.1 Literature Review of Political Connection..................................................16 
3.1.1 Political connection and internal and external characteristics ..............16 
3.1.2 Political connection and government intervention ...............................17 
3.1.3 Political connection and government support.......................................18 
3.2 Literature Review of Agency Cost...............................................................21 
3.2.1 Internal corporate governance and agency cost ....................................21 
3.2.2 External corporate governance and agency cost ...................................24 
Chapter 4 Research Design ....................................................................26 
4.1 Theory Analysis and Hypotheses .................................................................26 
4.2 Sample and Data ...........................................................................................28 
4.3 Measurement of Variables............................................................................29 
4.3.1 Measurement of political connection....................................................29 
4.3.2 Measurement of agency cost.................................................................31 
4.3.3 Control structure ...................................................................................34 
4.4 Modles ............................................................................................................37 
Chapter 5 Empirical Results..................................................................39 














5.2 Multicollinearity Test....................................................................................40 
5.3 Regression Analysis.......................................................................................42 
5.4 Robustness Test .............................................................................................46 
5.5 Further Test ...................................................................................................47 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Research Prospect ...................................50 
6.1 Conclusions....................................................................................................50 
6.2 Research Prospect .........................................................................................50 
6.2.1 Event study............................................................................................50 
6.2.2 Measurement of political connection....................................................51 
















































                                                        

























































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
